Terror organization: Quds Force Status: The deputy commander of the IRGC for operations. Role: Nilforoushan began his military activities in the 1980s joining the Basij and later the IRGC, holding various positions including Deputy Commander of the IRGC Ground Forces for Operations. He is mentioned in the Irani media as a “key figure” with extensive battlefield experience who played a crucial role in supporting the “Resistance Axis, including Hezbollah in Lebanon and Palestinian resistance groups,” helping to strengthen their capabilities against Israel. During the Iran-Iraq War, he served in various positions in the 14th Imam Hossein Division and the 8th Najaf Ashraf Armored Division, including platoon commander, company commander, battalion commander, axis commander, and deputy operations commander of the 8th Najaf Division under the command of Ahmad Kazemi. Previously, his military career included positions such as deputy operations commander of the IRGC Ground Forces, commander of the IRGC Command and Staff College, deputy to the IRGC Commander-in-Chief at the Imam Hussein Headquarters, executive deputy of the IRGC, and deputy operations commander of the IRGC during Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi's tenure. He has been serving as the deputy operations commander of the IRGC since 2019. He also had 5 years of experience in Lebanon and Syria on his resume. Nilforoushan served as the Deputy of Operations for the IRGC Ground Forces from 2005 to 2007. Between 2010 and 2014, he worked as the commander of the IRGC Command and Staff College, and since 2019, he has been the Deputy of Operations for the IRGC. On October 26, 2022, the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Department of State jointly sanctioned Nilforoushan for his role in suppressing protests in Iran. Following the elimination of IRGC General Mohammad Reza Zahedi in an Israeli attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus in April 2024, Nilforoushan assumed command of the Lebanon front. Nilforoushan was killed in an Israeli attack on a meeting between Nasrallah, top Hezbollah members, and IRGC commanders. Location: Iran/Lebanon Born: 1966 Isfahan, Iran Died: 27 September 2024 (aged 57–58) Beirut, Lebanon Cause of death: Assassination by airstrike Allegiance: Iran Service/branch: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Years of service: 1980–2024 Rank: Brigadier general
Status: Senior Iranian Quds Force operative in Unit 402, Head of Iran's Drone Program in Iraq. Role: He is behind the arming activities of Irani proxy militias in Iraq, by manufacturing and operating UAVs for them. Sattari potential importance derives from the regime's importance in the use of drones by the militias in Iraq and Syria. The essence of Sattari role includes coordination with the Iraqi militias on the issue of drones, and in particular he is responsible for coordinating the supply, armament and training of the militias for the attacks they carry out. As such, his role is characterized by close work with those pro-Iranian Iraqi militias, such as Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata'ib Hezbollah, and the Badr organization. In addition, his job requires travel, such as those he has made several times in the past to Iraq (for example, last April) and possibly to Syria as well. Location: Iran. Frequent travels to Iraq and could be to Syria as well. Also Known As: Mohammad Sattari
Status: Operative in Department 84010 of unit 840, Quds Force. Role: A veteran Quds Force operative, formerly active in Germany with several contacts in Turkey. Location: Iran
Status: Quds Force operative Role: Azizallah Jamali is a valued veteran Quds Force operative. He is involved in Quds Force operational activity abroad. Location: Iran Also Known As: Azizallah Jamali
Status: Operative in Department 84010 of unit 840. Role: A veteran operative and a member of Hejazi’s operations in Venezuela and Turkey. Used the forged passport under the name Saber Ramzani (Ramdani). Location: Iran
Status: Operative in Department 84010 of unit 840. He is responsible for operations in Latin America - unit 840. Son of Ali-Asghar Hejazi, acting chief of the Supreme Leader's Office and, as such, a highly respected Quds Force member. Role: He’s mainly operational base is in Caracas, Venezuela. He used a forged passport under the name of Asghar Fateminiya. His personal involvement in the covert planning and establishing covert networks for terror activity worldwide is proof of the aggressive, unrestrained policy being led by the Iranian regime with the approval and encouragement of the leadership. Location: Iran
Status: Responsible for recruiting and handling agents to carry out terror activity worldwide – unit 840. Role: He meets with his agents in various countries including Iraq and Turkey. Specializes in activity in Azerbaijan, given his knowledge of Azeri and Turkish. Handled an Azeri citizen called Husein Imanov to set up a terror infrastructure in Azerbaijan. Imanov was detained and is awaiting trial in Azerbaijan. Location: Iran
Terror organization: Quds Force Status: Operative Role: Hamas’ contact person in Quds Force in Yemen. Shipping weapons to Gaza Location: Yemen Also Known As: Abu-Abdallah
Terror Organization: IRGC IO Division 8000. Status: Operative at the IRGC IO division 8000 – unit 8040. Role: Operative at the IRGC IO division 8000 – unit 8040. Unit 8040: operates in the field of air defense and air defense systems training. Part of this unit responsibility is sending electronic warfare and special air defense systems to target countries. The commander of this unit is Qadratullah Fatemi. Location: Iran
Terror Organization: IRGC - Electronic Command (IRGC-CEC). Status: “Shahid Hemet” cyber unit. Role: Serves in “Shahid Hemet” unit under the supervision of Amir Lashgarian (Cyber). Location: Iran
Terror Organization: IRGC IO Division 4000 (Special Operations). works under the command of Javad Ghafari. Status: Head of logistics of Division 4000. (He owns that position due to close relations with Javad Ghafari.) Role: Khademi has been responsible for the transfer of ammunition for the IRGC IO.
He is one of the individuals who is directly responsible for stirring up the region by sending ammunition to Hezbollah and the militias in Iraq and Syria. Location: Iran
Terror organization: IRGC Status: IRGC - Quds Force operative. Role: IRGC - Quds Force operative, lives in Peru since the late 90’s. was arrested March 2024 in Lima for an attempted to execute a terror attack in an APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum) summit in the capital. The target was supposed to be an Israeli known figure that was attending the conference. Location: Peru. Known also as: Azizi; Activities: Police in Peru announced the arrest Friday of an Iranian citizen who was purportedly a member of Iran's Quds Force and allegedly planned to kill an Israeli citizen in the South American country. Gen. Óscar Arriola, Peru's police chief, said in a press conference that Majid Azizi, 56, was arrested Thursday in Lima, along with two Peruvian citizens. Arriola said authorities thwarted the attack against the Israeli. He did not identify the intended target for security reasons. Police are still looking for a third Peruvian they think was in charge of the plot to kill the Israeli man, he said. Arriola said Azizi entered Lima on March 3, and they were alerted about him by foreign intelligence offices. The Associated Press couldn't independently confirm whether Azizi is a member of the Quds Force. Iranian authorities did not comment, and Iranian state media did not acknowledge the arrest early Saturday. Iran has run intelligence operations in South America in the past, particularly through the expeditionary Quds, or Jerusalem, Force of its paramilitary Revolutionary Guard. Iran maintains close ties to Venezuela. The Quds Force was linked to an impounded Boeing 747 in Argentina and later seized by the United States. And most notoriously, Argentina believes Iran was behind the 1994 bombing of a Jewish center that killed 85 people.
Terror organization: IRGC Intelligence Organization Status: Senior operative at division 4000 Role: Special operations department of the IRGC's intelligence organization. Works directly under Javad Ghaffari. Location: Iran; Address:Iran; Activities: Senior operative at division 4000 - special operations department of the IRGC's intelligence organization. Works directly under Javad Ghaffari
Terror organization: IRGC Intelligence Organization Status: Senior operative at division 4000 Role: Senior operative at division 4000 - special operations department of the IRGC's intelligence organization. Works directly under Javad Ghaffari. Location: Iran; Also Known As: Amir Hosein Hoseini; Address:Iran; Activities: Senior operative at division 4000 - special operations department of the IRGC's intelligence organization. Works directly under Javad Ghaffari
Terror organization: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Cyber-Electronic Command (IRGC-CEC) Status: Shahid Hemet unit Role: Serves in Shahid Hemet unit under the supervision of Amir Lashgarian (Cyber). Location: Iran; Also Known As: Mohamad Qazvini; Address:Iran; Activities: Serves in Shahid Hemet unit under the supervision of Amir Lashgarian (Cyber).
Terror organization: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Cyber-Electronic Command (IRGC-CEC) Status: Shahid Hemet unit Role: Serves in Shahid Hemet unit under the supervision of Amir Lashgarian (Cyber). Location: Iran; Also Known As: Amir Hosein Hoseini; Address:Iran; Activities: Serves in Shahid Hemet unit under the supervision of Amir Lashgarian (Cyber).
Terror organization: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Cyber-Electronic Command (IRGC-CEC) Status: Shahid Hemet unit Role: Serves in Shahid Hemet unit under the supervision of Amir Lashgarian (Cyber). Location: Iran; Address:Iran; Activities: Serves in Shahid Hemet unit under the supervision of Amir Lashgarian (Cyber).
Terror organization: IRGC Quds Force Status: Quds Force operative - Unit 400. Role: An Iranian Afghan citizen, works for Quds Force - Unit 400. Tajik was involved in the attack attempt in Georgia in November 2022 Location: Iran; Also Known As: Ali Reza Tajik; Address: 1. Iran; Activities: An Iranian Afghan citizen, works for Quds Force - Unit 400. Tajik was involved in the attack attempt in Georgia in November 2022
Terror organization: IRGC Quds Force Status: Quds Force operative - Unit 400. Role: A Quds Force operative - Unit 400. Rahmani is actively involved in the recruitment of the Afghans to execute IRGC terror attack plots around the world. Location: Iran Also Known As: Housein Rahmani; Address: 1. Iran; Activities: A Quds Force operative - Unit 400. Rahmani is actively involved in the recruitment of the Afghans to execute IRGC terror attack plots around the world.
Terror organization: IRGC Status: He is an Iranian businessman who has helped acquire and supply sophisticated technology that has supported IRGC weapons production and sales. Role: Since 2014, Ardakani has used his network of intermediary companies, including Malaysia and Hong Kong based front companies and UAE logistics businesses, to procure and to facilitate the transfer of sensitive U.S. and foreign origin materials, components, and technology to Iran for its weapons programs. These weapons, including the Shahed-136 and Shahed-131 UAVs, are developed on behalf of the IRGC and then sold on the international market. Some of those UAVs have been sold to the Russian armed forces for its use in its illegal military operation in Ukraine. Proceeds from these arms sales directly benefit the IRGC. U.S. origin flight guidance components procured by the Ardakani network have been identified in recovered wreckage of Shahed drones in Ukraine and other conflict zones. Additionally, the Ardakani network has illegally procured U.S. export-controlled high electron mobility transistors (a.k.a. HEMTs) and other components with ballistic missile applications, as well as other electronics with weapons application. His companies: Malaysia-based front companies supporting the Ardakani network include Arta Wave Sdn Bhd, Integrated Scientific Microwave Technologies, and Tecknologi Merak Sdn Bhd.
These companies and others have a corporate registration in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, with unregistered representation and common addresses in Hong Kong. The companies act as proxies for Ardakani to acquire U.S. and foreign origin materials, which are otherwise unobtainable through legitimate procurement channels due to U.S. sanctions and export controls targeting Iran and the IRGC. UAE based businesses, including Dubai based Smart Mail Services, Ring Field FZE, and others, have been identified as witting shipping facilitators used to submit false or misleading shipping information, circumvent U.S. and non-U.S. sanctions and export control regulations, and transship illegally procured components to the IRGC on behalf of Ardakani. Ardakani also operates Tehran-based businesses Kavan Electronics Co, Ltd, Basamad Electronic Pouya Engineering Co, and Teyf Tadbir Arya Engineering Co. Location: Iran
Position: Basij, he is the secretary of Allameh Tabatabaei, Shariati branch: He reports the names of all those who participated in the demonstrations in the area, due to that many of the protesters were sent to reform camps. Location: Iran
Position: He is the commander of one of the most clandestine battalions of IRGC Air Defense Command. Gudarzi secret battalion carries out secret technology activities for the Air Force Defense Command. Location: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen
Position: He is a senior commander of one of the most secret battalions (of Guderzi) that carries out secret technology activities for the air defense command of the IRGC Aerospace Force. Location: Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen
Position: He is responsible for training the Hezbollah operatives and Russian soldiers in the IRGC’s “TIK” company. Thise company produces missiles and body parts for UAVs including and maybe especially to the Shahed 136. Location: Iran
Terror organization: IRGC’s Intelligence Organization. Position: Operator/contractor at the IRGC’s Intelligence Organization. Role: Was supposed to launch a terror attack in Cyprus which was foiled. Location: Unknown, possibly Iran.
Terror organization: IRGC’s Intelligence Organization. Position: Senior operative in the IRGC’s Intelligence Organization. Role: Commanding operations (terror attacks) abroad. It was exposed he was the commander operator (handler) to the supposed assassin Yousef Shahabazi Abbasalilu. Location: Unknown, possibly Iran.
Terror organization: IRGC Quds Force; Status: A member of the scientific staff at Imam Hossein University and a respected expert on international relations; Role: Rouzbeh uses his extensive geo-political knowledge to train and instruct Palestinian terror operatives; Location: Iran; Palestine; Also Known As: Hossein Rouzbeh; Gender: Male; Address: Palestine; Activities: An Iranian academic, a member of the scientific staff at Imam Hossein University and a respected expert on international relations. Dr. Rouzbeh has published several books on the relations between the U.S. and Iran, and he is a sought-after lecturer at many conferences and academic programs, including the Second National Conference for the Islamic Regimes, where he gave a speech as head of the International Future Research Center at Imam Hossein University. Rouzbeh uses his extensive geo-political knowledge to train and instruct Palestinian terror operatives.
Terror organization: IRGC Quds Force; Status: Iranian polygraph expert, head of the Sina Cognitive Behavioral Sciences Research Institute; Role: He uses his extensive knowledge as an expert in cognitive neuroscience and Doctor of Psychology to train and instruct Palestinian terror operatives; Location: Iran; Palestine; Also Known As: Mojtaba Khodadadi; Gender: Male; Address: Palestine; Activities: Iranian polygraph expert, head of the Sina Cognitive Behavioral Sciences Research Institute. He uses his extensive knowledge as an expert in cognitive neuroscience and Doctor of Psychology to train and instruct Palestinian terror operatives
Terror organization: IRGC Quds Force; Status: An Iranian hacker and IT expert. He works as an instructor for the Quds Force -Palestine Branch; Role: Provides computer and cyber training to Palestinian operatives from various organizations; Location: Iran; Palestine; Also Known As: Abdul Homaei; Gender: Male; Address: Palestine; Activities: An Iranian hacker and IT expert. He works as an instructor for the Quds Force -Palestine Branch. As part of his work for the branch, he provides computer and cyber training to Palestinian operatives from various organizations.
Terror organization: IRGC Quds Force; Status: Senior official in key position who serves under Mohammed Said Izadi, the head of the Quds Force Palestine Branch. Specific roll, involved in training for Palestinian organizations; Role: Involved in training for Palestinian organizations; Location: Iran; Palestine;
Also Known As: Haj Majid Born: 1961; Gender: Male; Address: Palestine; Activities: Senior operative. Senior official in key position who serves under Mohammed Said Izadi, the head of the Quds Force Palestine Branch. IRGC – Quds Force – Palestine Branch: Support for Hezbollah and Hamas” military activities:
The Palestine Branch, which operates within the framework of the Quds Force, is responsible for maintaining the continuous contact between the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and the terrorist organizations that are constantly fighting against Israel (Hezbollah, PIJ, and Hamas). In addition, the Branch is responsible for supporting them financially and professionally (knowledge and means). The branch is headed by Mohammed Said Izadi, known as Haj Ramadan. Izdi is a 58-year-old Iranian living also in Lebanon and regularly moves on the Iran-Syria-Lebanon route. Under Izdi”s command, we are familiar with three other senior Iranian figures in the Palestine branch who are involved in training, operations, and assistance to the Palestinian organizations: first, Ali Marshad Shirazi, aka “Abu Javad,” born in 1969, lives and works in Lebanon. The other, Majid Zaree, aka “Abu Ruqayyah,” born in 1977. The third, Mostafa Majid Khani (aka Haj Majid), born in 1961, is involved in training and instruction.
Terror organization: IRGC Quds Force; Status: Senior official in key position who serves under Mohammed Said Izadi, the head of the Quds Force Palestine Branch. Specific roll, Responsible for operations with Palestinian organizations; Role: Responsible for operations with Palestinian organizations.; Location: Iran; Palestine; Also Known As: Majid Zare; Abu Ruqayyah; Born: 29 September 1977; Gender: Male; Address: Palestine; Activities: Senior official in key position who serves under Mohammed Said Izadi, the head of the Quds Force Palestine Branch. Specific roll, Responsible for operations with Palestinian organizations. IRGC – Quds Force – Palestine Branch: Support for Hezbollah and Hamas” military activities:
The Palestine Branch, which operates within the framework of the Quds Force, is responsible for maintaining the continuous contact between the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and the terrorist organizations that are constantly fighting against Israel (Hezbollah, PIJ, and Hamas). In addition, the Branch is responsible for supporting them financially and professionally (knowledge and means). The branch is headed by Mohammed Said Izadi, known as Haj Ramadan. Izdi is a 58-year-old Iranian living also in Lebanon and regularly moves on the Iran-Syria-Lebanon route. Under Izdi”s command, we are familiar with three other senior Iranian figures in the Palestine branch who are involved in training, operations, and assistance to the Palestinian organizations: first, Ali Marshad Shirazi, aka “Abu Javad,” born in 1969, lives and works in Lebanon. The other, Majid Zaree, aka “Abu Ruqayyah,” born in 1977. The third, Mostafa Majid Khani (aka Haj Majid), born in 1961, is involved in training and instruction.
Terror organization: IRGC Quds Force; Status: Senior official in key position who serves under Mohammed Said Izadi, the head of the Quds Force Palestine Branch. Specific roll, involved in training for Palestinian organizations; Role: Involved in training for Palestinian organizations; Location: Iran; Palestine;
Also Known As: Haj Majid Born: 1961; Gender: Male; Address: Palestine; Activities: Senior official in key position who serves under Mohammed Said Izadi, the head of the Quds Force Palestine Branch. Specific roll, involved in training for Palestinian organizations IRGC – Quds Force – Palestine Branch: Support for Hezbollah and Hamas” military activities:
The Palestine Branch, which operates within the framework of the Quds Force, is responsible for maintaining the continuous contact between the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and the terrorist organizations that are constantly fighting against Israel (Hezbollah, PIJ, and Hamas). In addition, the Branch is responsible for supporting them financially and professionally (knowledge and means). The branch is headed by Mohammed Said Izadi, known as Haj Ramadan. Izdi is a 58-year-old Iranian living also in Lebanon and regularly moves on the Iran-Syria-Lebanon route. Under Izdi”s command, we are familiar with three other senior Iranian figures in the Palestine branch who are involved in training, operations, and assistance to the Palestinian organizations: first, Ali Marshad Shirazi, aka “Abu Javad,” born in 1969, lives and works in Lebanon. The other, Majid Zaree, aka “Abu Ruqayyah,” born in 1977. The third, Mostafa Majid Khani (aka Haj Majid), born in 1961, is involved in training and instruction.
Position: Head of “The Information and Protection Organization to the IRGC” (replaced Muhammad Kazemi in June 2022). Background: Prior to his current role he was the Head of the Defense Ministry’s Intelligence Security.
Special advisor to IRGC’s Aerospace Forces Commander He is the one who produced the exhibition of UAVs for the Russian delegation last summer in Kashan base. He personally accompanies the Russian forces on their operational training with the UAVs.
IRGC Aerospace Forces has several commands, one of them is the UAV Command, led by Saeed Aghajani. The UAV Command Headquarters is located at Dastvareh Garrison Base, which is also where the IRGC Aerospace Forces Command Headquarters is located.
aka: Hassan Amami Position: Commander of the “Vali Amr Protection Corps” – Khamenei’s personal security unit (since June 2022 replaced Ebrahim Jabbari). Background: Apparently, his shadow name was Hassan Amami, and he was not a known figure to the public before this role. Prior to his current position he was Mohammed Kazemi’s deputy in the counterintelligence branch – “The Information and Protection Organization to the IRGC”.
Position: Head of Counterespionage Operations in IRGC’s Intelligence Organization (Division 1500). Background: In parallel, he functions as a deputy to Javad Ghafari. The two know one-another from the time they served in Syria together and Bazghandi was Ghafari Chief of Bureau.
At the last years of Taeb as the Head of IRGC’s Intelligence Organization, unit 1500 transformed its main purpose and became more focused on terror operations. Without the right knowledge and personal to do so, this was a failure as well.
Bazghandi is also behind the last failed attempts to assassinate and kidnap Israelis in Turkey in the past few months.
Position: Deputy commander to the IRGC’s Intelligence Organization (since 2019) Background: Mohaghegh served in his early days in the Habib Battalion and was injured, he uses two crutches to this day. Before ascending to the deputyship of the IRGC Intelligence Organization, Mohaghegh was chief of staff of the IRGC’s 27th Division and later became the Head of the IRGC’s strategic intelligence division. In May 2019, the IRGC Intelligence Organization received another boost in stature when it merged with the IRGC’s strategic intelligence division, with Mohaghegh becoming Taeb’s deputy and continues to be Kazami’s deputy today.
aka: Hajj Kazem Born: 1957 Position: Position: Head of IRGC’s Intelligence Organization (since June 2022, replaced Hussein Taeb). Background: He serves in the IRGC since 1983.
Before his current position, Kazemi was the Head of “The Information and Protection Organization to the IRGC” (2009-2022). De
facto, IRGC’s Counter-intelligence branch (part of the security division) is responsible for identifying spies and fighting infiltration in the regime’s security apparatus. Along the years he commanded numerous operations against regime opponents, which gave him the nickname “the spy hunter” among the high ranks of IRGC. Kazemi is considered the IRGC’s highest official in terms of influence and he takes part at every operative decision the regime is about to take. The branch works independently and answers directly to Khamenei, therefore Kazemi has close relations with him. IRGC’s “Information and protection Organization” is considered as a supreme security institution.
In 2020 he established new unit – Supervision of the affairs of Revolutionary Guards commanders and officials. The need was born after multiply operational failures due to too much talking among the high command.
aka: Yasser or Reza Rezavi Position: Qods Force key figure in Syria. By virtue of his function, he is connected to various people involved in the transfer of weapons from Iran. Background: Rezvani served in the past in unit 190 of Quds Force, a unit that deals mainly with logistics of weapon and operatives smuggling.
He is in Syria for the last year and helps to Hezbollah to gather an arsenal of weapons in Syria and in Lebanon.
aka: Mohsen Kafi Position: Head of unit 340. Background: Has a PhD in mechanics from the Sharif University of Technology in Tehran. Prior to his current role he was president of the Iranian Space Agency (ISA). In the recent years, he served also as the president of the Iranian Space Research Institute (ARI).
Position: Head of unit 190 of Qods Force Background: Shahariari was the one who pushed forward the capabilities of the unit. He built and directed the infrastructure enabling Quds Force to transfer sensitive weapons from Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon via Syria. For this purpose, Shahariari has set up an extensive network of ties for smuggling goods in Syria and Lebanon. This smuggling network is supported by various cover companies that enables large amounts of money to be transferred between the organizations and its senior members.
Position: An Iranian intelligence operative who served time in prison in Dubai in the past for his part in the abduction and assassination of Abbas Yazdan Panah in 2013, an Iranian-British businessman who was an Iranian oppositionist. Background: In 2021 he was part of the squad managed by the headquarters of unit 840 of Quds force in Syria and contained Quds force and other intelligence members, Basij members and criminal syndicates. The squad planned to execute terror attacks on western targets in Colombia, US, Bulgaria, Azerbaijan, Kenya and more (none of them succeeded).
Position: Operative in Unit 840 of the Quds. Background: Force in the Caucasus and Asia Department. In recent years, he has been in contact with terrorist elements and Islamist organizations in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, and Uzbekistan, and directed a plan that was useful to the Revolutionary Guards to create terrorist attacks in the region.
aka: Mehdi Razai Position: Operative in unit 840 in the Europe and the US department. Background: He approached different Iranians that live in the US, to spot and detect “operational information” on senior US government officials. The operation was supposed to be a revenge for the US airstrike that killed Qassem Suleimani.
aka: Yunes Eliasi Position: Position: Senior operative of Quds Force special operations units. Background: Operates mostly in the Middle East region. Commanded the terror attack in New Delhi, India, 2012 when one Israeli diplomat’s wife was injured from a sticky bomb attached to her car by motorcycle.
Real Name: Mohammad Pour Naimi Born: 1957 Position: Deputy commander to Hamed Abdallahi in unit 400, the elite unit of Quds Force. Background: Prior to this role he was head of the foreign intelligence division in MOIS and later appointed to acting intelligence minister in parallel. In unit 400 he had command in many operations around the world, including a series of terror attacks against Israelis in 2012.
Majid is involved deeply in various IRGC projects in Syria, where he used to visit very often.
He is one of the masterminds behind the unit’s missions and he oversees the unit’s cooperations with terror organizations around the world.
Position: Commander of unit 400, the elite unit of Qods Force. He serves at this position approximately for a decade. Background: Before his appointment as Unit 400 commander, Abdallahi served in various positions in the IRGC and the Quds Force, including: commander of the Zahedan and Zabul area within the IRGC, deputy to Qassem Soleimani when the latter was commander of the 41st Division, and head of the Quds Force intelligence branch. Abdallahi was personally involved in carrying out terror attacks along his career.
As head of Unit 400, Abdallahi is involved in all its activities, approving attacks from inception to execution, including collection of intelligence, operational planning, final approval, and operational considerations, following attacks.
Terror organization: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Cyber-Electronic Command (IRGC-CEC) Status: Hamid Reza Lashgarian is the head of the IRGC-CEC Role: Hamid Reza Lashgarian has been involved in various IRGC cyber and intelligence operations Location: Iran; Also Known As: Hamid Reza Lashgarian; LASHGARIAN, Hamidreza; Amir Lashgarian; Name pronunciation: Lashgarian Born: 1961 Nickname: Ibrahim Qazizadeh Position: Brigadier-general, Head of IRGC-Electronic Warfare and Cyber Defense Organization (IRGC-EWCD) Head of IRGC’s unit Shahid Kaveh (“Group 13” of Shaid Kaveh specializes in cyber-attacks of ship and gas stations) He has a background of involvement in various IRGC intelligence operations against commercial navigation and other clandestine activities. He is a university lecturer with published articles. Lives in Tehran Hamid Reza Lashgarian is the head of the IRGC-CEC, and is also a commander in the IRGC-Qods Force. Hamid Reza Lashgarian has been involved in various IRGC cyber and intelligence operations.
Position: The cultural advisor of the Iranian Embassy in Iraq. Member/works closely with Quds Force. Background: This financial network is damaging the Iraqi economy, if only to circumvent sanctions and benefit the IRGC.
Position: -The Iranian ambassador in Iraq. -Former commander at one of the units of Quds Force. Background: He used to be the first deputy of Iraj Masjedi, the former Iranian ambassador in Iraq, who was also a high ranked commander in Quds Force and IRGC. Both Masjedi and Al-Sadegh were part of the close circle of Qassim Soleimani. This just shows that the USD smugglings through Iraq is extremely important to Quds Force, that’s why it needs to control the position of the ambassador.
This financial network is damaging the Iraqi economy, if only to circumvent sanctions and benefit the IRGC.
Position: Operative in Quds Force, deployed at the Iranian embassy in Iraq. Background: He receives the USD from exchange offices in Iraq after issuing a money deposit certificate in Tehran. Two other employees of the embassy named Mohammad Ebrahim Ali Abiri, and Nader Ramadan Noor Mohammad Kalidbar, are also members of the Quds Force and work closely with Pakbatan. This financial network is damaging the Iraqi economy, if only to circumvent sanctions and benefit the IRGC.
Position: Operative in unit 400. Background:
He commands on field the network which smuggles USD from Iraq. Reports to Tajan Jari.
This financial network is damaging the Iraqi economy, if only to circumvent sanctions and benefit the IRGC.
Position: The financial manager of unit 400. Background: He commands from Iran the operation of smuggling tens of millions of USD from Iraq to IRGC accounts in Iran with the cooperation of the Islamic Republic of Iran Embassy. He deposits the required amount to the account of the unit at the "Shaheed Agha Babaei" branch of Ansar Bank on Basij highway in Tehran. This financial network is damaging the Iraqi economy, if only to circumvent sanctions and benefit the IRGC.
Position: Operative in unit 400. Background: Commander of the assassination squad (wasn’t presence on scene during the operation, commanded from third country), that was foiled in Georgia, (November 2022) whose purpose was to kill an Israeli businessman. Besides the operational field, he is deeply involved in recruitment of Afghan operatives to serve its unit in terror attack.
Position: Operative in unit 400. Background: Head of the assassination squad on the feild, that was foiled in Georgia, (November 2022) whose purpose was to kill an Israeli businessman.
Position: Operative in unit 400. Background: Part of the assassination squad, that was foiled in Georgia, (November 2022) whose purpose was to kill an Israeli businessman.
Position: Operative in unit 400. Background: Part of the assassination squad, that was foiled in Georgia, (November 2022) whose purpose was to kill an Israeli businessman.
Position: Operative in unit 400. Background: Part of the assassination squad, that was foiled in Georgia, (November 2022) whose purpose was to kill an Israeli businessman.
Position: Commander in unit 840, stationed in Syria. Background: He was the one who commanded the foiled Assassination plot to kill former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and former national security advisor John Bolton.
Terror organization: IRGC Status: He is a senior Quds Force commander, Head of the “Abu Jihad’s Foreign Operations Unit”, located in Lebanon. Role: This unit is supervised by Quds Force and operates under Hezbollah. It is managing the coordination with the Palestinian terror groups like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. As a superior, he reports to the top command of the IRGC/Quds Force on what the unit needs, and one of his main responsibilities is to coordinate all elements involved in the operations of this unit. Location: Iran, Lebanon Born: 1964; Gender: Male; Passport: 9002446 (Iran); Address: 1. Iran;
2. Beirut, Lebanon; Known also as: Mohammad Sa'id Izadi; Ramazan Izadi; Saeed Izadi; Sa'id Abedini. Activities: Lebanon-based Izadi is the chief of the Palestinian Office of the IRGC-QF Lebanon Corp. As of late 2016, Izadi required a Hamas Political Officer member to get permission from three senior Hamas leaders in order to receive money directly from him. The Hamas Political Office member stated Izadi would be sending $1 million dollars in addition to Izadi’s regular allocation, and an additional $1 million dollars earmarked for the Hamas Political Office member.
Terror organization: IRGC and MODAFL; Status: Several positions: Chairman of the Board of Directors of Qods Aviation Industry, head of the Supply, Research, and Industry Affairs section of MODAFL, and Deputy Minister of Defense; Role: He has led Iran’s military research and development efforts and was responsible for negotiating Iran’s agreement with Russia for the supply of Iranian UAVs for Russia’s war in Ukraine Location: Iran; Also Known As: (Arabic: سید حجت اله قریشی); GHOREISHI, Sayyid Hojatollah; GHOREISHI, Sayyid Hojjatollah; GHOREISHI, Seyed Hojjatollah; GHOREISHI, Seyyed Hojatollah; GHOREISHI, Seyyed Hojjatollah; GHOREISZI, Seyed Hojjatollah E.; QOREISHI, Seyyed Hojatollah; QORESHI, Seyyed Hojatollah; QUREISHI, Seyed Hojjatollah; Date of Birth: 27 Sep 1964; Place of Birth: Iran; Citizenship: Iran; Passport: D10003923 (Iran) expires 15 Aug 2023 to 15 Aug 2024; N42881363 (Iran) expires 10 Oct 2022; D9021706 (Iran) expires 14 Jul 2021; D10007155 (Iran) expires 17 Aug 2025; A59655618 (Iran) expires 15 Sep 2027; National ID No.: 5929869741 (Iran) Activities: Seyed Hojatollah Ghoreishi (Ghoreishi) serves as the Chairman of the Board of Directors of QAI. As the head of the Supply, Research, and Industry Affairs section of MODAFL, and Deputy Minister of Defense, he has led Iran’s military research and development efforts and was responsible for negotiating Iran’s agreement with Russia for the supply of Iranian UAVs for Russia’s war in Ukraine. Ghoreishi is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, both MODAFL and QAI. Ghoreishi are using various means to help Quds Force convert its money into foreign currency. The methods include using foreign currency earned by Iran’s petrochemical companies, and selling gold and converting the money in Turkey through Halk Bank and Ziraat Bank. This is supervised by Quds Force member Behnam Shahriyari Morallo. Esmaeili was designated by the U.S. Treasury.
Terror organization: an Iranian businessman connected to IRGC/QF; Status: key figure in IRGC/QF operational smuggling method of Venezuelan gold to finance Hezbollah; Role: He is familiar with Nicolas Maduro and Tareck Al Aissami, he manages the operation of smuggling the Venezuelan gold using planes of Iranian company Mahan Air. The plane will stop on the way back to Iran in Turkey or in Africa and the gold will be sell illegally and the money will go directly to Hezbollah Location: Iran, Venezuela; Also Known As: Seyed Badroddin Naiemael Mosavi; Badr Ad-Din Naimi Musawi; Date of Birth: 1975; Place of Birth: Iran; Citizenship: Iran; Activities: Seyed Badroddin Naiemael Moosavi, owner of a company in Dubai (ACS Trading Co.), facilitated the movement of the gold from Caracas to Turkey to finance Hezbollah terrorist activities. “This Iranian businessman controlled the load of gold that he obtained at a discounted price and negotiated the oil shipments that had to compensate the ingots that arrived clandestinely in Tehran,” explains the Israel-Anti-Money Laundering (i-aml) site. “Once the gold was in the capital of Iran he made another trip to Turkey to sell it on the black market. The result of this illegal operation – millions of dollars – was used to finance Hezbollah’s terrorist acts in the Middle East.”
Terror organization: IRGC - Iran; Status: The CEO of Mahan Air; Role: Before his current position which he handles since 1996, Khanouki served as commander of the IRGC forces in Croatia and Bosnia. Qasem Soleimani was part of his social circle. Khanouki is well-connected with senior Quds Force officials and serves as a senior Quds Force advisor in several fields as of weapons smuggling, aircraft procurement, and aviation issues. Apparently, Khanouki recently arrived in Syria regarding meetings concerning the airline’s flights to the Nayrab airport in Aleppo and the Rafic Hariri airport in Beirut. Involves in the highest level in the operational desertions od Quds Force unit 190 responsible for weapons smuggling in the region; Location: Iran; Also Known As: Hamid Khanouki; Place of Birth: Iran; Citizenship: Iran; Nationality: Iran; Activities: Hamid Arabnejad Khanouki – Trustee, Board Treasurer in Mola al-Movahedin Charity; (Khanouki is the CEO of Mahan Air, a position he has held for nearly two decades. He also holds positions at several Mahan Air/MMC–affiliated companies, including Pardis Parham Kish and Pardis Lalim Development. Public records show Qasem Soleimani’s brother Sohrab represented one of the subsidiaries of MMC on the board of Pardis Parham Kish while Khanouki was its board chairman. Sohrab Soleimani is still on the board of Pardis Lalim Development.)
Terror organization: Iran – IRGC – Quds Force Status: Zahedi (sanctioned by the US) has been the commander of the Lebanon Corps since 2008. It is his second term as corps commander, the first term was between 1998-2002. Between 2001-2008, Zahedi filled senior positions in the IRGC, including Commander of the IRGC Air Force, commander of the IRGC Ground Forces, and commander of the Thorallah command, responsible for security in Tehran. He was also deputy commander of Quds Force. In his current position as commander of Quds Force's Lebanon Corps, Zahedi plays a critical role in the military assistance Quds Force provides to Hezbollah in Lebanon, includes: maintaining close relations between Iran and Hezbollah at top level of command, visit Hezbollah units in the Beqaa as checking their preparedness, and participates in meetings of Hezbollah's Shura council, which outlines the organization's policy. He is special advisor for the Syrian intelligence and strongly involved in the assistance Iran gives Assad's regime. Overseas IRGC-QF Unit 18000. Unit 18000 is in the Syrian division of QF and cooperate with local army smuggling weapons and equipment. Role: Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) in Lebanon; Overseas IRGC-QF Unit 18000; Location: Iran and Lebanon and Syria. Also Known As: Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi; Hassan Mahdvi; Activities: Mohammad Reza Zahedi is an Iranian senior military officer in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. He previously commanded its Air Force and Ground Force and currently serves as is one of the top commanders of the Quds Force; Has acted as a liaison to Hezbollah and Syrian intelligence services. Reportedly guaranteed weapons shipments to Hezbollah;
Terror organization: Iranian Basij; Status: Head of the Iranian Basij; Role: Head of the Basij since 2019, he is involved personally and as a commander in human rights violations of Iranian citizens. During his career and especially since he was put in his current position by Khamenei, the Basij oppress, wounded, and killed a high number of Iranian citizens; Location: Iran; Born: 1964; Place of Birth:Iran; Gender: Male; Nationality:Iran; Known also as: Soleimani, Gholam Reza; Soleymani, Gholam Reza Activities: Gholamreza Soleimani (Soleimani) commands the Basij, one of Iran’s most important domestic security resources. The Basij has been heavily involved in violent crackdowns in Iran, including following the June 2009 contested presidential election, and in November 2019, during Soleimani’s tenure, when the Basij reportedly were among the Iranian security organizations that collectively killed hundreds of Iranian men, women, and children. Treasury designated the Basij pursuant to E.O. 13553 on June 9, 2011, for, among other activity, its role in the 2009 post-election crackdown. Soleimani was sanctioned by the European Union in April 2021 for his role in the violent response to the November 2019 protests; Brigadier General Gholamreza Soleimani was appointed by the Supreme Leader on July 2, 2019 as the Commander of the Basij Resistance Force, a paramilitary force subordinate to IRGC. Among other malign activities, the IRGC’s Basij militia recruits, trains, and deploys child soldiers to fight in IRGC-fueled conflicts across the region;
Position: A Quds Force operative stationed in Syria/Lebanon. Background: He is involved in a joint project of Quds Force and Hezbollah’s ESO (unit 910) that includes recruiting Pakistani and Afghan proxies to carry out terror attacks.
Position: Quds Force’s commander in Yemen (unit 400). Background: He oversees the strong connection with the Houthis, including weapon supply, training, intelligence gathering and operations. On the night of the US airstrike to eliminate Soleimani, Shahlaei was the second target with an airstrike in Yemen around the same time, but he escaped in time. He has a long history of targeting Americans and U.S. allies globally. For example: Multiple assassinations of coalition forces in Iraq, provided weapons and explosives to Shia extremist groups, planned the 20/01/2007 attack in Karbala, Iraq, that killed five U.S. soldiers and wounded three others. As a financier and senior IRGC official, Shahlaei funded and directed the plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the United States in Washington, D.C. in 2011. He also planned follow-on attacks inside the United States and elsewhere. Had this scheme succeeded, as many as 200 innocent civilians in the United States could have been killed.
Position: Special adviser to the commander of Quds Force and member of Quds Force’s Command Council. Supervisor of the Quds Force headquarters’ projects – reports to Khamenei.
Position: Deputy commander of Quds Force. Background: Prior to this role he was Quds Force’s deputy for coordination affairs.
From 2007 – 2013 he served in Syria and was promoted to the status of the local deputy of operations of Quds Force there.
Position: Head of the Special Operations Division (Division 4000) in IRGC’s Intelligence Organization (replaced Reza Seraj). Background: He is one of the senior figures behind the failures of trying to assassinate and kidnap Israelis abroad in the past few months.
Prior to his current role he was the Commander of the Iranian forces in Syria.
He was “expelled” from Syria due to “major breach of Syrian sovereignty”, in fact, the reason was Assad’s request to Ghafari superiors after the last ordered to attack US forces and deployed Iranian weapon in unapproved places in the country. He put Syria in huge risk of opening a war with Israel.
He is considered a problematic figure. This is the main reason he was deployed in the shadows, out of Quds Force regular institutions, as he failed many times in his new role (first as a deputy to Reza Seraj) due to lack of knowledge in special operations.
The failures of the two made Ghafari to take Seraj position. Furthermore, he dismissed a lot of the division’s personnel simultaneously, which left him with unexperienced employees not capable to do their jobs as he wanted them to. Now he works vigorously to steal manpower and capabilities from other Qods Force and IRGC units.
Position: Unknown, former Head of the Special Operations Division (Division 4000) in IRGC’s Intelligence Organization (replaced by his former deputy Javad Ghafari). Background: He is behind multiply failed attempts to assassinate and kidnap Israelis in the last months in places like Turkey, Cyprus, and UAE. He is now the head of foreign intelligence division (Unit 800) in IRGC's Intelligence Organization Reza Seraj, the IRGC-Intelligence Organization's former foreign intelligence chief who played a critical role in Iran’s overseas assassination plots for many years, died on September 21 after undergoing surgery for a brain tumor. His death followed reports on September 2 about his deteriorating health, though IRGC-affiliated Fars website had initially denied the severity of his condition. A longtime member of Iran's security apparatus, Seraj was designated by the US Treasury Department last year for his role in overseas assassination plots and human rights abuses in Iran. He had earlier served as the head of the Special IRGC Intelligence Directorate, also known as Unit 4000, before being removed after a plot to assassinate an Israeli in Cyprus was uncovered. Following his removal, Javad Ghaffari, a figure expelled from Syria, took over the leadership of this unit. In the last years of his life, the IRGC brigadier general held the position of spokesperson and deputy for communications at the Supreme National Security Council. However, Seraj came to be recognized for his human rights violations. Starting his career in the 1990s, Seraj rose through the ranks as a senior interrogator within the IRGC Intelligence. Operating under the alias "Alavi," he became known as “the chief interrogator for many political and student activists, extracting forced confessions through pressure and torture.” His actions during this period left a mark on the lives of many activists, including Ali Afshari, a political figure who in an interview with Iran International identified Seraj as the lead interrogator during his 2000 arrest. Ahmad Batebi, a journalist at VOA Farsi also wrote on X: “This accursed individual was one of those who played a significant role in torturing me during interrogation and applying psychological pressure to force a false confession in front of state TV cameras. He also tortured many students and political activists to fit them into the absurd scenarios created by the security agencies.” Seraj was also appointed head of the Student Basij and later appeared as an "analyst and academic" regularly featured in state-controlled media. As the head of the Student Basij, he was actively involved in suppressing students during the 2009 protests, according to Dadgostar, a site documenting human rights violators in Iran. Throughout his career, Seraj held various roles within the IRGC, including the political deputy of Sarallah Headquarters in Tehran, deputy head of the IRGC Intelligence Organization, and head of the Prophet Muhammad faculty and Imam Hossein University. In addition to his political and security roles, Seraj was also involved in the interrogation and torture of Fahimeh Dorri Nogourani, the wife of Saeed Emami, a former Deputy Minister of Intelligence. Seraj was also one of the commanders responsible for the attack on political prisoners in Ward 350 of Evin Prison on April 17, 2014, an incident that came to be known as the Black Thursday of Evin. In the aftermath of the attack, political prisoner Gholamreza Khosravi Savadjani reported that Seraj had personally escalated his sentence from three years in prison to execution. Khosravi was hanged less than two months later, on June 1, 2014, in Rajai-Shahr Prison. Hossein Salami, IRGC Commander-in-Chief, praised Seraj in a statement on Saturday, calling him "effective" in confronting what he described as the "sedition movement," a reference to anti-government protests. Salami said, “Seraj played a significant role in confronting sedition … and raising awareness in dealing with various deviations that threatened the Islamic Revolution.”
Position: Head of Quds Force (replaced Qassem Soleimani after his death, January 2020). Background: Serves in the IRGC since the 80’s. In his early years in Quds Force, he was appointed to the eastern border of Iran, fighting the Taliban and their control of drug smuggling. Qaani oversaw financial disbursements to terror organizations around the world, including Hezbollah.
He was Soleimani’s deputy since 1997. He does not have a charismatic character like Soleimani, and it is common rumor that he received his position due to respect to Soleimani who recommended him for this position.
Terror organization: Iranian IRGC; Status: Head of the IRGC's Intelligence Organization; Role: He is the strongest figure in the Iranian intelligence. Before that he was the Basij commander. Was sanction this year due to severe violation of human rights; Location: Iran; Also Known As: Hosein Taeb; Hussayn Taeb; Hassan Taeb; Hussein Taeb; Date Of Birth: 1963; Country:Iran; Activities: Hossein Taeb is an Iranian Shia cleric and senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps official who is currently the head of the IRGC’s Intelligence Organization; Under Taeb’s command, the Basij have been very active in suppressing protest over the controversial 2009 Iranian presidential elections. The suppression has seen the death of at least dozens of protesters on the streets or in prison; In public statements Taeb has cautioned Iranians that the United States was “hiring agents and mercenaries in an effort to continue its plots for a soft overthrow of the Islamic Republic,” according to the Iranian Fars news agency. Taeb has also stated that the post-election “anti-government riots” “killed eight members of the Basij and wounded 300 others.”;
Terror organization: Iranian IRGC; Status: Aerospace force commander of the IRGC; Role: A dominant figure in IRGC terror system, behind the latest progress in the drone abilities of IRGC. Took responsible for the missile launching at the Ukrainian airplane; Location: Iran; Born: 1962; Place of Birth:Iran; Gender: Male; Type(s) of Organization: Militia, political party, social-service provider, terrorist, transnational, violent; Ideologies and Affiliations: Iranian-sponsored, Islamist, jihadist, Khomeinist, Shiite; Known also as: Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh; Activities: Amir Ali Hajizadeh is the internationally designated commander of the Aerospace Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). He holds the rank of brigadier general. In this role Hajizadeh oversees Iran’s ballistic missile program. He claims the main purpose of Iran’s missile program is to strike Israel. Hajizadeh is a staunch opponent of the 2015 nuclear agreement between Iran, the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, China, France, and Russia, which he saw as an attempt to weaken Iran. As head of the IRGC’s missile program, he routinely boasts of Iran’s military capabilities and regional dominance while directly threatening to strike U.S. and Israeli positions in the Middle East if those countries provoke the Islamic republic. Hajizadeh has warned that the United States’ intentions in Iraq and Syria is to destroy those countries, but Iran has thwarted those plans. Under Hajizadeh’s command, the IRGC Aerospace Force has provided advisory assistance to Iraq’s air force. Hajizadeh publicly boasts of Iran’s military prowess, which he has said has no equal. He has warned that all American bases and ships within 2,000 kilometers of Iran are within the range of Iranian missiles. According to Hajizadeh, Iran is always fully prepared for war. Hajizadeh has welcomed a potential Israeli strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities because it would give Iran reason to retaliate and destroy Israel. After Iran conducted missile tests in 2012 against a mock U.S. base, Hajizadeh declared the tests were a message against the “bullying” of Iran. The U.S. government has linked Hajizadeh to Iran bringing down a U.S. drone on June 20, 2019. As head of the IRGC’s aerospace division, Hajizadeh also commands the IRGC’s missile development and arsenal. In April 2017, the Trump administration reportedly called for inspections of Iranian military sites in order to monitor the country’s missile program. Hajizadeh has rejected all calls for such oversight. Hajizadeh accused the United States of trying to disarm Iran through various tactics. In March 2018, French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian called on Iran to curb its missile program during a visit to Tehran. Hajizadeh accused France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and “the Zionist regime”—i.e., Israel—of manipulating international law for their own benefit. Hajizadeh has labeled U.S. criticism of Iran’s missile program as a “pretext” for U.S. animosity against Iran. On January 3, 2020, a U.S. airstrike in Iraq killed Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force. On January 8, Iran launched a missile strike on the Ain Al-Asad airbase in Iraq. The IRGC claims the attack killed at least 80 Americans. U.S. officials denied any fatalities but at least 34 American troops were diagnosed with traumatic brain injuries. Also on January 8, Iranian forces shot down a Ukrainian passenger plane, killing all 179 on board. Hajizadeh claimed Iran mistook the plane for a cruise missile. According to Hajizadeh, the IRGC boosted its aerospace defenses in response to U.S. aggression. Hajizadeh warned that the January 8 attack on Ain Al-Asad was just the beginning of Iran’s response to Soleimani’s death. Hajizadeh called the revenge operation “Martyr Soleimani.”
