Mozambique the most overt manifestation of terrorism in southern Africa

Terrorist activity in Mozambique is the most prominent and overt manifestation of jihadi terrorism in southern Africa, according to a new report.

The Middle East Africa Research Institute (MEARI), in a recent publication entitled ‘Tracking Terrorism Trends in Africa,’ reported that although southern Africa is yet to fully see the massive “explosion” of jihadi terror on the scale that has been witnessed elsewhere on the continent, terrorism firmly emerged in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province.

“The group now known as Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) emerged as an armed group in October 2017, known locally both as Ahlu-Sunnah wal Jama’a (ASWJ) for its ideological underpinnings and al-Shabaab for its extensive use of violence,” MEARI stated.

Al-Shabaab has not been particularly outspoken about the goals of its insurgency, but it has articulated a desire to establish rule by a hardline version of Islamic law in Cabo Delgado. The group’s aims appear to centre on undermining and degrading the Mozambican government’s military and political authority.

Religious and ethnic tensions, alongside poor regional economic conditions, are also reportedly prominent factors motivating the violence. The militants are believed by local leaders and community members to be primarily “disaffected” youth motivated by complex political, economic, and social factors including feelings of marginalisation and disagreements with religious authorities in Cabo Delgado. The insurgency’s socio-economic roots were also raised, linked to Cabo Delgado’s perceived “resource curse”, whereby despite abundant natural fossil resources, the local population remains impoverished and does not reap the benefits of their exploitation, according to the report.

Decades of government neglect and systematic underinvestment have left Cabo Delgado the poorest province in Mozambique. This has created a widespread sense of resentment and frustration, especially among Mwani and Makua ethnic groups, who blame the dominance of Maconde ethnic business elites and local officials—the ethnic group of President Filipe Nyusi—for the Mwani and Makua’s political and economic exclusion. The discovery of rubies in Montepuez in 2009 and liquid natural gas in the seabed off Palma in 2010 have exacerbated tensions, as communities who lost access to their fishing grounds or were cleared off their cultivated land in Cabo Delgado are yet to see promises of job opportunities and prosperity materialize. Scores of Mwani and Makua youth eventually joined ASWJ.

Mozambican armed forces were ill-equipped and poorly trained to handle a militant Islamist insurgency. They responded to ASWJ’s brutal acts of violence with their own ruthless tactics that reportedly included the widespread use of torture, extrajudicial executions of civilians suspected of supporting the group, and the mutilation of bodies of presumed ASWJ fighters. This only further increased ASWJ recruitment and violent reprisals against civilians, MEARI research found. Severe feelings of collective discontent among the Northern locals have served as a fertile recruitment basis for the extremist group.

Despite its rapid growth up to 2021, it has been one of the Islamic State’s (IS) most opaque affiliates. ISM was first recognized far later as a distinct IS province – only in May 2022, having previously been under the broader Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) organization from as early as 2018.

In terms of the growth period from 2017-2019 – the insurgency’s early years, the group was marked by a lack of a clear identity. The names ‘ASWJ’ and ‘al-Shabaab’ signalled violent jihadist ideology, but public messaging from the militants themselves was rare. Nevertheless, the targeting of civilians by insurgents obscured any political objectives, MEARI reported.

“At first Islamic State Mozambique’s political objectives were not immediately apparent or overt. They first became clearer when formal affiliation of the insurgents with ISCAP was issued through IS media channels in June 2019. The Islamic State’s Central Africa Province (ISCAP), with the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) operating in DRC, at its centre, had formally been acknowledged by IS in 2018. The ADF/ISCAP relations with Cabo Delgado’s insurgent group predated June 2019 considerably. The United Nations Group of Experts presented evidence of movement between ADF and Cabo Delgado’s insurgent group as early as 2017. The affiliation with IS sharpened the Cabo Delgado insurgents’ ideology and would translate into both technical assistance and external financial support.”

According to ACLED analysis, tactical training was provided as early as 2020. There is also evidence of payments to Mozambique as early as 2020, through the remittance of money that had been raised in Somalia and South Africa and sent to Mozambique and DRC through agents in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda.

The impact of Islamic State support from Somalia became increasingly apparent in 2020 and 2021. This permitted ISM to increase its operations and allowing the insurgency to reach the peak of engagement in political violence events in June 2020. Insurgents targeted urban centres, seized control of Mocímboa da Praia town in August 2020, for at least a year and twice threatened the LNG project at Palma.

Insurgents targeted state institutions such as garrisons, police stations, health centres, and schools. They also regularly targeted neighbourhoods dominated by state employees and the homes of prominent figures in the ruling Frelimo party or business people. The shift in operations and targets was seen to be indicative of an increased interest in taking on the state and undermining LNG investment in the region. Between January and November 2020, the group was responsible for over 400 violent incidents that left more than 1,300 people dead.

The insurgents’ attack on Palma town on 24 March 2021 presented a real threat to the LNG project. Total had to declare force majeure in April 2021 because of the degrading security situation. In response both SADC (SAMIM) and Rwanda intervened in July 2021. As a reflection of the critical importance of the LNG project to both the Mozambican government and to the insurgents, the Rwandan military deployed in Palma and Mocimboa da Praia districts. The Rwanda Security Forces (RSF) successfully gained control of both district headquarters by August 2021, less than two months after the initial RSF deployment.

The terrorist group officially began operating as ‘Islamic State Mozambique Province’ in May 2022, identifying itself as such in its communications through IS media channels, as well as in its direct messaging in Cabo Delgado communities.

The number of violent incidents linked to militant Islamist groups in northern Mozambique increased by 29% in 2022 to 437—a reversal of the 23% drop in 2021. Dislodged from the cities of Palma and Mocimboa da Praia along the coast, smaller groups of militants relocated to more rural districts west and south, preying on villages—committing killings, beheadings, abductions, looting, and the destruction of property.

In 2023, the group was estimated by some to have as few as 300 active fighters, compared to up to 2 500 in 2020. For the first eight months of 2023, ISM was involved in an average of just 11 political violence events per month, compared to an average of 36 per month in 2022.

In terms of funding, international efforts had been undertaken to disrupt the financing of Islamic State Mozambique. “Alarmingly South Africa was named as a major financing hub for ISM. The US designated four ‘Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and ISIS-Mozambique (ISIS-M) financial facilitators based in South Africa.’ Financial sanctions were imposed upon Farhad Hoomer, Siraaj Miller and Abdella Hussein Abadigga for ‘playing an increasingly central role in facilitating the transfer of funds from the top of the ISIS hierarchy to branches across Africa’ or serving as leaders of ISIS cells in South Africa’. An individual known as Peter Charles Mbaga had allegedly also assisted in transferring funds and equipment from South Africa to ISIS-M and sought to procure weapons from Mozambique. South Africa’s financial system had been considerably exploited towards funding ISIS branches and networks across Africa,” MEARI found.

The report added that the concern that South Africa already to some extent is operating as an evolving Islamic State Province in Southern Africa in own right poses a significant threat to South Africa’s national security and regional security if left unchecked. In October 2022, the US embassy in Pretoria issued a security alert about a possible terrorist attack in the upmarket Sandton commercial district. The attack didn’t happen, though this might have been due to heightened security because of the alert. “South Africa had not suffered any major terrorist attacks over the past few year, but the country remains highly vulnerable to ISIS overtures. Of even greater concern is that the country’s financial system provided a critical conduit for funding extremism. In February 2023, the Financial Action Task Force placed South Africa on a list of countries under increased monitoring, commonly known as the grey list, after it failed to address all of the shortcomings on preventing money laundering and the financing of terrorism that the task force identified in its 2019 evaluation of the country.”

By July 2023, the insurgency in Mozambique had reportedly killed around 6 700 people and displaced 950 000 more since its inception. As of April 2024, the militants had once again been consolidating territorial gains whilst the Southern African Mission was in the process of withdrawing. More Rwandan forces, however, entered the Mozambican battle space.

“The Mozambican armed forces, the FADM, have so far proven unsuccessful in preventing the growth of militant cells. The improvement of the situation is likely largely attributable to foreign assistance. This began with the deployment of the SAMIM forces from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in July 2021, and the additional support of the Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) in December 2022,” MEARI stated.

From May 2023 reports emerged that ISM leadership had adopted a new strategy that excludes excessive violence against civilians. Data released by the non-profit Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) shows a noticeable decline in violence across Cabo Delgado.

While Islamist violence in northern Mozambique dropped 71% between 2022 and 2023, MEARI cautioned that the possibility of the group gaining further ground and recapturing lost ground as 2024 unfolds should not be ruled out.

“In Southern Africa, and despite the worrying developments in Mozambique, South Africa is the country to watch. Like Nigeria in West Africa, South Africa dominates Southern Africa completely. Consequently, what happens in this regional superpower will have a profound impact on its neighbourhood. So, the March 2024 reports that Islamic State continues to receive funds from Johannesburg through robberies and the like is disconcerting to say the least. It suggests the greylisting of South Africa by the FATF was a prudent measure. It also suggests that because of endemic corruption and the lack of political will on the part of Pretoria, South Africa remains a permissive environment in which terrorists and their networks continue to thrive. Indeed, this has a long history with terrorist and their support networks from Al Qaeda to Hamas and Hezbollah as well as the Taliban finding refuge in the country for three decades. There is a real danger that the war in Gaza, which has been inflaming anti-Israel and anti-West sentiment may well create the ideal opportunity for Islamists to exploit,” MEARI cautioned.

Source » defenceweb.co.za