For Hezbollah’s Nasrallah, Border Games Begin in the Lebanese Presidential Palace
Hezbollah’s recent activity – including mutual verbal assaults, dire warnings and threats with Israel – is not entirely disconnected from Lebanon’s domestic politics
August 02nd, 06AM August 02nd, 06AM
The verbal assaults, dire warnings and threats Israel and Hezbollah have been trading in recent weeks are reminiscent of the tensions that surfaced a year ago.
Back then, they occurred against the background of Hezbollah’s firing of three drones (all intercepted) at the Karish gas field off the Israeli and Lebanese coasts. Hezbollah warned Israel against beginning production at the field unless Lebanon’s demands were met. Today, it is the big tent and the “insolence” of Hezbollah fighters trying to break through border fences, walking up to the border and violating UN Resolution 1701, which was approved at the end of the 2006 Second Lebanon War.
The latest violation occurred over the weekend when a group of youths carrying Hezbollah flags broke through a fence running between the village of Al-Abbasiya and the Wazzani River, which passes under the village of Ghajar. Since a section of the road was closed by the UN observer force UNIFIL in 2006, Lebanese nationals have been prohibited from using it. A report by the Al-Manar television network said the fence was breached in response to Israel’s “occupation of the northern part of the village of Ghajar.”
The “occupation” that the news report was referring to is the construction of a fence around Ghajar, an Alawite village that was annexed to Israel in violation of the Blue Line marked out by the United Nations after Israel’s 2000 withdrawal from Lebanon. The line divided the village into a northern part that is supposed to be under Lebanese control and a southern part under Israeli control, hence the fence was partly built in the territory of Lebanon.
Local leaders in Ghajar insist that the fence wasn’t constructed by Israel but by the local council to protect against wild animals that have damaged the property, and in one case even caught a child who was rescued at the last minute. Lebanon doesn’t buy that. It says Israel built the fence to annex more Lebanese territory and create facts on the ground. They say the local council could never have built a fence like that without Israel’s encouragement and approval.
The fence was built last September, about a month before Israel and Lebanon reached their gas agreement, to which Hezbollah gave its unofficial but essential backing. The organization even welcomed the agreement, calling it a historic political victory.
Why did Hezbollah wait more than 10 months between the “annexation” of Ghajar and the erection of two tents on the border and a breach of the fence?
Israel believes Nasrallah “identified” signs of Israeli weakness in the protests against the judicial coup, reservists saying they would stop reporting for duty, domestic political divisions and warnings about the IDF’s combat readiness. Hezbollah sees this as an opportunity not only to violate agreements but risk a war with Israel. Hence, Israel has responded threateningly.
However, this analysis does not offer a convincing explanation for why Hezbollah needs any kind of provocation to drag Israel into war, and whether it is even interested in a conflict to begin with.
As in many previous instances, Hezbollah’s activity is not entirely disconnected from Lebanon’s domestic politics. For many months, Hezbollah has been working hard to preserve its status as the master of the house while showing off its military prowess. Even before President Michel Aoun stepped down last October, Nasrallah was working to ensure Aoun’s successor would be someone who supported the “resistance,” meaning a president who would not try to disarm it, would adopt its policy and that of Iran toward Syria, and would ensure the state budget addressed the organization’s interests.
However, Nasrallah’s attempt to find an agreed upon candidate failed, and Lebanon has been without a president since last October. No solution is in sight. The current government, led by Prime Minister Najib Mikati, is a caretaker government that is supposed to prepare the country for elections. Parliament has failed 14 times to assemble a majority in favor of a new president.
Nasrallah is insisting on his candidate, Suleiman Frangieh. But Gebran Bassil, Aoun’s son-in-law, has his own candidate and may be interested in the job for himself. Recently, Bassil has hinted that he may support Frangieh on condition that parliament enacts a law granting more powers to the governorates, and establishes a sovereign wealth fund that will hold profits generated by future gas and oil production and from other state assets.
The idea behind the proposal is that the government is unable to effectively manage its revenues and should therefore share them with the governorates. In addition, the plan would make it more difficult for powerful politicians in Beirut to pocket government revenues. Lebanon would thus be able to escape the economic crisis in which it is mired.
The proposal, which many in Lebanon doubt is feasible, would also deprive Hezbollah of much of its control over the state budget. Thus, while the organization may get the president of its choosing, it will come at a high economic price.
The organization had not publicly responded to the proposal. But it has apparently decided to employ the Israel threat, as it did in the run-up to the gas agreement, to “explain” to its political opponents that any agreements it finds unacceptable risks are opening the gates of hell for Lebanon by provoking Israel into a war.
As usual, Hezbollah makes its political case back in Beirut, far away on the border with Israel. Lebanon says that this so-called Blue Line, which was marked and defined by a joint Israeli-UN team following Israel’s withdrawal, left 13 disputed points, including the Shebaa Farms and Ghajar. (In practice, it is only six points, since on the other points there is at least informal agreement.)
The Lebanese government and Hezbollah agree on the need to draw a final border and bring an end to the saga. Israel, which has adopted the UN’s border route, refuses to renegotiate the border. Alternatively, it says that if Lebanon wants to talk, it must first curb Hezbollah efforts to unilaterally impose a new border line.
In any case, border negotiations are not in the offing, not only because of Israeli opposition but because some of the disputed border areas, including the Shebaa Farms and Ghajar, are considered by the UN to be Syrian territory, not Lebanese. In an effort to prove previous Lebanese control, thousands of hours of discussions, examinations of old maps and testimonies were spent without arriving at conclusive proof. Syria did indeed state at the time that the two areas belonged to Lebanon, but refused to hand over a written document confirming this. Israel maintains that in light of the Syrian position, any withdrawal from the Shebaa Farms will have to be done in coordination with Syria. As for Ghajar, since the village has been officially annexed, withdrawing from it will be subject to a national referendum in Israel.
So long as there is no solution to the border, Hezbollah can continue to portray its activities in disputed areas as a legitimate national effort to return Lebanon’s territory. That is a mission that the Lebanese government cannot oppose despite the risk that it may lead to a conflict with Israel. However, at the same time, the Lebanese government is conducting intensive talks with the United States and France in a bid to blunt the threat of war.
The “tent campaign,” as U.S. diplomatic sources call it, is connected to the political outcome in Beirut. If a president is elected who undertakes economic reforms enabling aid money to be released, the tents may also be taken down.
However, a solution does not depend solely on the Lebanese government or the West willing to help it: Iran also has something to say on the matter. And after the agreement it reached with Riyadh, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman may be the matchmaker, if he decides to support a political solution and is ready to put money into Lebanon’s reconstruction. The assumption is that Iran is not interested in Lebanon entering into a conflict with Israel at a time when it is restoring ties with the Arab world and its Syrian ally is returning to the Arab bosom. Nasrallah will also have to take this into account.
Source: msn
