Don’t be deceived, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is a terror organization!
HTS is a radical terrorist organization that is directly responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands of people in Syria in the past seven years. Although the organization liberated Syria from its brutal dictator Bashar al-Assad, we recommend that you never forget its origins and deeds along the way, which may suggest a new brutal dictatorship. Al-Julani and his designated ministers already stated that Syria will be a country of Sharia law. They even use the jihadist flag.
Mohammad al-Julani was educated on the values of the more extreme terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qaida and ISIS. So, placing the crown on his head as if he were the knight of freedom and liberty is a huge mistake.
Never forget 9/11!!
The following is a background on Al-Julani and HTS so his real face will appear on the table of the decision-makers for all to see, while considering to remove him and the organization from the sanctions list.
Abu Mohammad al-Julani: A Profile
Ahmad Hussein al-Shara, known as Abu Mohammad al-Julani, was born in 1982 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. His father worked as an economic advisor in the oil industry during the 1970s and 1980s, while his mother was a geography teacher. In 1989, at age 7, he returned with his family to Damascus. (very similar to UBL).
In a 2021 interview with PBS, he explained that his nom de guerre “Abu Mohammad al-Julani” was inspired by his family’s origins in the Golan Heights. According to him, his grandfather fled the Golan during the 1967 Six-Day War.
Early Life and Education
In Damascus, Julani completed his primary and secondary education. He later enrolled in university studies in communications. Some reports indicate he briefly studied medicine for about two years before leaving. In 2003, he joined jihadi Islamist organizations in Iraq, specifically the “Mujahideen Battalions” in Mosul, where he pledged allegiance to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, then head of Al-Qaeda in Iraq and later one of the founders of ISIS. Julani was imprisoned by American forces at Camp Bucca from 2004 to 2010 (while he was released in 2010 the camp was under Iraqi control already), after which he joined the Islamic State of Iraq. Meanwhile, little is known about his general Islamist activities and inclinations; his jihadi engagement has been clear since 2003.
Formation of Jabhat al-Nusra
In mid-2011, Julani arrived in Binnish, Idlib province, northwestern Syria, along with Abu Mohammad al-Adnani (then the official spokesman of the Islamic State of Iraq). They came as representatives of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq. They established contact with local notables, intending to support the uprising against Assad’s regime. By late 2011, they had established Jabhat al-Nusra (The Support Front) to actively fight against the Assad regime.
Under Julani’s leadership, Jabhat al-Nusra operated against the Assad regime with support from the Islamic State of Iraq. Julani gained significant support as the leader of a strong, unified faction opposing the Syrian government.
Break from ISIS and Al-Qaeda
The organization remained affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq until 2013 when al-Baghdadi attempted to merge both groups into what would become ISIS. Al-Julani rejected this merger under the direction of Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, instead pledging allegiance to al-Zawahiri and completely separating from ISIS.
In 2013, the U.S. State Department designated al-Julani as a global terrorist, offering a $10 million reward for information leading to his capture, and declared Jabhat al-Nusra a terrorist organization.
Transformation or tactics?
In a surprising move in July 2016, al-Julani announced his organization’s split from Al-Qaeda, rebranding it as “Jabhat Fatah al-Sham.” In 2017, the group attempted to merge several opposition factions under a new name, “Hayat Tahrir al-Sham” (HTS). While initial merger attempts faced setbacks, HTS, under al-Julani’s leadership, eventually established control in northwestern Syria, particularly in Idlib.
Since gaining control of Idlib, Julani has gradually moderated his stance, abolished strict religious committees that interfered with civilian affairs, and began reaching out to Western public opinion through media interviews.
Recent Developments
Following the major offensive against the Assad regime in November 2024, Al-Julani has increasingly positioned himself as a moderate leader. He has issued reassurances to Syria’s minorities, with an emphasis on the Christians, promising protection and inclusion in a future Syria. HTS has adopted symbols of the civil opposition, including the Syrian independence flag.
Recently, Julani has begun signing statements with his real name, Ahmad al-Shara, as part of efforts to shed his militant image and present himself as a leader of a “Syrian national project.” In a December 2024 CNN interview, he discussed plans for establishing an institutionalized government and a “council elected by the people.”
Rising concerns and controversies
1. The break with Al-Qaeda was never articulated publicly.
The July 2016 speech by the Al-Nusra Front’s founder, announcing a “break” with Al-Qaeda, was highly nuanced. He never explicitly stated he was severing ties with Al-Qaeda. After praising the organization in the first part of his address, Abu Mohammed al-Julani eventually announced the creation of a new movement, stating it had no affiliation with any external structure—implying Al-Qaeda. Similarly, Ayman al-Zawahiri responded to this declaration with equal ambiguity: “You can sacrifice organizational ties without hesitation if they endanger your unity,” but this did not mean relations between the two entities had ceased. The group’s radical Salafist ideology and terrorist methods remained unchanged. Ayman al-Zawahiri’s lieutenants, who were helping Abu Mohammed al-Julani build an Islamic emirate in northern Syria, were not expelled. This represents a clear example of dissimulation (taqiya), a practice common among terrorist movements, both at individual and collective levels.
2. Sharia rule and crackdown on dissent in Idlib
HTS maintains its primary stronghold along the Turkish border, stretching from Jisr al-Shughur to Bab al-Hawa. The group exercises complete control over both urban and rural areas, which is crucial for establishing its dominance over the province and maintaining vassalage. This strategic position makes it increasingly difficult for other factions to obtain weapons and ammunition, leading to their inevitable weakening.
This territorial control gives HTS a monopoly over both smuggling operations with Turkey and international humanitarian aid distribution. Such aid is essential for supporting the 2.5 million inhabitants of the Idlib region, half of whom are internally displaced persons. By June 2017, HTS had connections to 86 out of 156 local aid-receiving committees. Two months later, the group moved to bring all committees under its direct control, subsequently announcing the formation of the “Salvation Government” in Idlib in November 2017. This government maintains its grip on the population through control of international aid flowing through Bab al-Hawa.
Abu Mohammed al-Julani has actively engaged with foreign journalists and researchers to manage his image in the West, attempting to portray Idlib as a free and stable region. However, the reality is that of an Islamic emirate governed by Sharia law. No opposition to his autocratic rule is permitted. A religious police force enforces strict moral codes, requiring women to wear Islamic dress and prohibiting music, alcohol consumption, and other practices deemed part of Jahiliyyah (the pre-Islamic period considered a “state of barbarism”). March 2024 witnessed protests in Idlib over massive arrests and torture and demands to get rid of Al-Julani’s rules. Protesters related stories of the arrest of anyone who criticized al-Julani and HTS.
Unlike ISIS, HTS does not practice sexual slavery or public executions and, notably, has renounced global jihad, making it appear less threatening to Western observers. Nevertheless, the presence of hundreds of European jihadists, including approximately one hundred French nationals, has transformed the Idlib region into “an operational base for transnational jihad. American officials have described this region as the world’s largest Al-Qaeda sanctuary.”
3. Involvement of foreign jihadists and murder of prisoners
On July 20th, 2021, Jihadist-affiliated sources released photos from a meeting between HTS leader Abu Muhammad al-Julani and leaders of affiliated foreign jihadi groups. The gathering was reportedly an Eid al-Adha celebratory dinner. Attendees included Abdul Aziz Domla, leader of the Uzbek Katibat al-Tahwid wal-jihad (KTJ), Abu Muhammad Turkistani from the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), and Abdullah Dagestani (seated to al-Julani’s right), who leads Liwaa al-Mohajirin wa-l-Ansar (LMA). LMA is an organization of Caucasian jihadists in Syria.
France is concerned over dozens of French jihadists fighting in Syria. There are French fighters affiliated with the Omsen Brigade that frequently clashes with Al-Julani’s Tahrir al-Sham; however, there are also other French jihadists who joined HTS. Approximately 100 French jihadis were sheltering in the area under the control of HTS even before the outbreak of the current confrontation and the downfall of Assad’s regime. The participation of some French jihadis in the attack on Damascus within the ranks of HTS is also a known fact.
Indeed, judging by the content of Telegram channels affiliated with HTS, the group applies its commitment to the freedom of religion and distancing from ISIS-style atrocities. Al-Julani reiterates slogans emphasizing the Syrian nation’s unity, etc. However; one can easily discern total control over the information flow in the channels affiliated with HTS: each Telegram channel is affiliated with the HTS press service, HTS security service or the HTS war propaganda.
The links to the channels are made in such a way that it is almost impossible to guess the channel’s orientation. No one can post messages on the channels except for their admins. There are no discussion forums that usually characterize other jihadi groups. It is plausible to assume that such control of information facilitates HTS and al-Julani to forestall “sporadic” lapses by HTS ranks and files, which would compromise al-Julani’s stance.
Yet, all social media platforms are abundant with video clips where one can see the indiscriminate murder of Assad’s soldiers. Many incidents were reported in Hama. Many Russian Telegram channels also released video shootings with the execution of prisoners. In one of the videos, two gunmen, allegedly belonging to HTS, shoot dead two men lying on the ground after having declared “these are Nusayri pigs” (al-khanazir al-nussayriya). Nusayri is a pejorative term for the Alawites that is employed by jihadists.
4. Al-Julani’s shaykh Abd ul-Rahim Atoun
Abd ul-Rahim Atoun (Abu Abdallah al-Shami) is the highest religious authority (shaykh & mufti) of the HTS and al-Julani. Before the split of the HTS, he was the shaykh of Jabhat al-Nusra.
On September 15th, 2021, Atoun delivered a lecture titled “Jihad and Resistance in the Islamic World: Taliban as a Model.” The lecture was organized by the HTS-backed Salvation Government in Idlib city. Atoun, who is second-in-command after HTS leader Abu Mohammad al-Julani, appeared with a notably different presentation style. His lecture emphasized the parallels between the Taliban movement and HTS, focusing on the group’s evolution, particularly its shift toward localized activities within Syria and its desire to establish international diplomatic relations.
On October 23rd, 2023, Atoun delivered a lecture about the “common wound of Idlib and Gaza”. He spoke about “our people who face an internal foe who consists of Assad’s gangs and the international foe who is Iran. Whereas our people in Palestine the Zionist occupiers”. He went on to say that what was going in Syria and Palestine was jihad, implying a personal duty [of participation in jihad] for each Muslim”.
Atoun runs a Telegram channel where he publishes his fatwas (sharia rulings).
The wording of his fatwas leaves no room for doubt that he is a typical jihadist, which implies wholehearted support for Taliban, Al Qaeda and Hamas. Here below are excerpts from his lectures and fatwas:
• Attitude to Shi’a and Alawites
“Our current battle and jihad in Syria took place under the shadow of the blessed Syrian revolution, and God willing, we will continue this revolution and jihad until we purify the Levant from the filth of Assad and his allies or perish in the process.
Whoever follows the mobilization of Assad and his allies and their bombardment in the north while the Zionist occupation forces penetrate the south without any sense or information knows for sure that the hostility of Assad and the flocks of Rafidis [pejorative term for designating Shi’a] with him towards us is many times greater than their hostility towards the Zionists.
Our battle is originally with Assad = the criminal, infidel, aggressor + the one who cooperates and identifies with the Zionists + the one who is a lion against the Sunnis and an ostrich towards the Zionists.” (https://t.me/abomuhammad2022/2665)
“Any attempt to stir up the sentiment of the one umbrella and the name of Islam between us and them [ the Shi’ites]: ignorant attempts that do not know the truth in its absolute scope, nor do they know the reality of these people.
Today’s Rafidah is more wicked, more despicable, and more hostile to Muslims than any other sect, and they and the Jews are equal, rather they outdo the Jews in some aspects of filthy morals, They and the Jews are in one enmity, so do not belittle the status of any one of them, rather our nation and our youth must be built on not believing them, and not looking at them except as enemies, and whoever belittles all of this is ignorant or malicious and does not work for the benefit of the religion and the nation.” (https://t.me/abomuhammad2022/319)
Similar planning of the Hamas planning and Syrian uprising
“The military operations carried out by the revolutionary factions in Idlib towards Aleppo are naturally the result of accumulated work of planning, information monitoring, training, arming, and manufacturing. In recent years, it has been said about it, as was said about Hamas before the Al-Aqsa flood, that it has abandoned the cause, and its concern has become ruling to the last of the accusations that the unemployed and short-sighted always repeat. We ask God for victory, success, and guidance for every sincere and honest son of the nation and to keep away from them the brokers of wars and the trumpets of sedition.” (https://t.me/abomuhammad2022/2732)
Support for the Hamas massacre
Atoun reposted a telegram post saying that “The Battle of #Flood_of_Al-Aqsa is the first powerful blow of the pickaxe in demolishing the Zionist project that took the West more than a hundred years to build when they laid its first brick in the first Zionist conference, and when they established it 75 years ago, they spent hundreds of billions of dollars on it to achieve their goals”. Above the post, there is a picture of a Hamas terrorist waiving a riffle before murdering an Israeli soldier. (https://t.me/abomuhammad2022/1428)
Conclusion
The findings above clearly show that HTS perfectly fits all the definitions of an Islamist jihadist movement. Like all other Islamist jihadist movements, it embraces rabid anti-infidels and anti-Semites. Its attitude towards Arab and Muslim minorities is no different from that of other jihadist movements.
This position suggests that al-Julani’s official statements are merely tactical and lack any substance. Although some of the principles of jihadist ideology may not be on Julani’s list of priorities, it does imply that this ideology exists and is far from disappearing.
One must keep in mind that the organizational formal framework of Islamist movements has always been fluid. To that effect, the break within ISIS or sporadic conflicts with other jihadi groups are always conjectural and not substantial. Moreover, the conflict with ISIS does not necessarily mean HTS’ moral rejection of ISIS methods; some other pragmatic reasons may be at play. One should beware of confusing pragmatism with moderation.
Likewise, HTS does not call for foreign jihadists to come to Syria to fight in its ranks. However, as mentioned above, foreign jihadists do participate in joint fighting with HTS, while there is no room for interpretation that HTS has moral claims in this regard. For now, HTS does not call for attacks outside of Syria, although in the Middle East things change and turn upside down in the blink of an eye.
Although HTS has liberated Syria from the regime of the tyrant Assad, it is best not to forget that it is still a terrorist organization, that has intentions to create the legendary “Al Sham” (Greater Syria) that includes Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel.
Its leaders grew up in the worst terrorist organizations, and although al-Julani uses tactics of deception towards the West, his true intentions and goals are still those of a terrorist, who as such was directly involved in the deaths of many people.
Once HTS is strong enough in Syria, it will certainly try to challenge the West. Like all radical Muslim organizations, eventually, after they deal with internal issues, they will go to fight abroad to conquer and destroy the infidels in their eyes. History repeats itself, always.
Taking out HTS and Julani from the sanctions list today is a naïve action that the West will regret in only a couple of years.
Don’t be deceived!
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