ISIS Shows Signs of Division Over Propaganda Strategy
ISIS has never been shy on bravado. Claiming attacks and an ability to storm capitals has been used to strike fear in enemies since it rose to prominence.
But a recent report that the terror group intentionally holds back from publicizing its own attacks reveals internal tensions and a dynamic that policymakers leading the fight against ISIS need to consider.
On June 25, ISIS released a report on Telegram showcasing its military operations in Syria, particularly in Deir Ezzor and Daraa. What set this report apart from others was that several of the attacks had not been previously claimed by the group.
While the notion that ISIS underreports for security reasons the attacks it carries out is not new, another set of ISIS documents, allegedly leaked and published by an anti-ISIS outlet, further support this claim, indicating that it is not merely a self-serving narrative.
The leaked documents provide valuable insights into the decision-making behind claiming certain attacks and not others, as well as the resulting internal tensions within the group. It also shows that analysts solely relying on the number of claimed attacks will not get an accurate measure of a militant group’s strength. Therefore, policymakers should exercise caution and take a comprehensive approach when assessing the group’s capabilities and the threat it poses.
The leaked documents were published by Fadh Ubbad Al Baghdadi and Al Hashimi on June 20 and June 21. The outlet – whose name means, “Exposing the worshippers” of the slain ISIS leaders Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi and Abu Ibrahim Al Hashimi Al Qurashi – is a pro-Al Qaeda, anti-ISIS account that posts comments and allegedly leaked internal communications from the group.
According to the documents, the ISIS media department is typically responsible for publicizing attacks. They receive local documentation and forward it to the central division for publication. However, the decision of whether to publicize an attack rests with both senior media and military commanders, and local military leadership has the authority to veto publication if they believe it is against their interests.
The leaked documents also reveal contrasting perspectives between media and military commanders in Syria regarding which attacks should be publicized. While some branches, like Deir Ezzor, cooperate with media personnel, others, such as the Badia and Daraa branches, reject the idea of publishing attack claims. The military leadership, particularly in those regions, reportedly enforces a media silence policy due to security concerns.
This divergence in views has resulted in internal tensions and disputes. Media officials critical of the de facto gag order argue that it is counterproductive, benefiting the group’s enemies and impeding propaganda efforts. They contend that aside from failing to deter counter-offensives by enemies, publicizing ISIS activity would instill fear among “apostates” and potentially inspire similar attacks in Syria.
To bolster their argument, the media officials allegedly asked how the situation in Syria was any different from areas in Iraq where its fighters, despite facing intense military pressure, still issued attack claims.
ISIS has previously acknowledged the silence policy in its weekly newspaper, Al Naba. In a March 16 article, the group claimed that it intentionally withholds some attack claims for operational reasons.
In a rare interview in July last year with the head of ISIS operations in Syria’s Badia – a vast desert region connecting Homs, Hama, Raqqa, and Deir Ezzor – a similar claim was made. The official said ISIS conducted a significantly higher number of attacks than it publicly acknowledged, indicating a strategy of selectively sharing, delaying or withholding information about attacks for operational reasons. Interestingly, the commander cautioned supporters who may be excited about sharing news of the group’s attacks to refrain from doing so and strictly adhere to ISIS’s official claims.
It is important to acknowledge that ISIS’s narrative about media silence could be used to justify the notable decrease in the group’s reported attack figures. However, ISIS is not the only entity that has highlighted a strategy of underreporting. The Rojava center, which monitors ISIS attacks in areas held by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), said the group is known to carry out unclaimed attacks in northeast Syria. The center also said that out of the 285 attacks attributed to the group in 2022 by outside media, ISIS only claimed responsibility for 185.
Furthermore, on June 23, ISIS said it had carried out attacks targeting Syrian regime forces and the SDF in northeastern Syria, resulting in the killing and injury of 19 fighters in seven operations. The attack on Hasakah’s Sina’a prison in January last year is another reminder of the manpower and organizational acumen that ISIS still holds. These offensives, among many others in the recent past, strongly suggest that despite a drop in claimed attacks, ISIS cells still maintain a position of advantage in many areas, enabling them to carry out attacks at their discretion.
This highlights the importance of adopting a more nuanced approach to the danger ISIS poses in Syria and the wider region. Policymakers and analysts, therefore, should move beyond relying solely on official claims and adopt an evidence-based approach that takes into account the group’s military attacks and capabilities, as well as its media policies, financial resources, and influence over local communities.
Source: menafn
